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Abstract The increase in incarceration of offenders in the United States over the last
40 years has created a system of mass incarceration or mass punishment. While conse-
quentialist theories of punishment may generate considerable doubts about the value of this
system, it seems that retributive theories of punishment lack the resources to criticize mass
punishment. Because of their focus on individual desert, it seems that they can say nothing
about punishment in the aggregate. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for a certain kind
of retributivism to question the justice of mass punishment. When retributive punishment is
considered as one of the functions of a state whose task is to create and maintain a system
of equal freedom for all, then punishment must be justified not only at the individual level
but also at the level of the system of punishment as a whole. If the criminal justice system
inflicts excessive amounts of punishment in the aggregate, it becomes unjust, not because
individual offenders are treated unjustly, but because a policy of relentless prosecution and
punishment is not appropriate for a free society.
Keywords Mass incarceration  Mass punishment  Theories of punishment 
Retributivism  Kant
1 Introduction
The most striking change in the criminal justice system of the United States over the last
40 years has been the increase in incarceration of offenders, in terms of both the number of
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people and the proportion of the population imprisoned.1 There has, over the same time
period, also been a substantial increase in the use of other punishments, such as probation
and fines. In light of these changes, U.S. criminal justice is aptly described as a system of
‘‘mass punishment’’ or ‘‘mass incarceration.’’ While utility-based justifications for pun-
ishment can provide reasons to doubt the justice of this system,2 it seems there is one
theory of punishment that lacks the resources to criticize mass punishment: namely,
retributivism. If the great majority of people who are punished are indeed guilty of the
offences they were convicted of, then each of them got what they deserved, and so it seems
that retributivism can say nothing about how many people are punished. And so, it seems,
we should either reject retributivism or accept that very high levels of incarceration raise
no issue of justice. In this paper, I present a retributivist argument against mass punish-
ment. If retribution is not a way of giving individual persons what they deserve from a
moral point of view but one of the functions of a state whose task is to create and maintain
a system of equal freedom for all, then mass punishment is objectionable for the same
reason that forgoing criminal law entirely would be objectionable: while the state may well
need to punish some people in order to maintain a system of equal freedom, a system in
which massive numbers of people are punished is not a system of freedom. If the criminal
justice system inflicts excessive amounts of punishment in the aggregate, it becomes
unjust, not because individual offenders are treated unjustly, but because a policy of
relentless prosecution and punishment is unjust in a free society.
2 Mass Punishment and Retributivism
2.1 The Phenomenon of Mass Punishment
The facts concerning mass incarceration in the U.S. are familiar and need be only briefly
reviewed.3 In the early 1970s, the incarceration rate in the U.S. was about 0.16%. But at
any given moment in 2012, about 0.71% of the population of the U.S. was incarcerated:
that amounts to more than 2 million people and is the highest incarceration rate in the
world. In Canada, which is in many respects legally and culturally similar to the U.S., the
incarceration rate is somewhat over 0.10%; in the western European countries, it is gen-
erally under 0.10%. Moreover, the risk of incarceration is not evenly distributed across the
U.S. population. The incarceration rate is much higher for African-Americans than for
whites, and very high indeed for African-American men. In 2010, more than 33% of
African-American men between the ages of 20 and 39 without a high-school diploma were
incarcerated. Looking at the risk of incarceration over time rather than at a point in time, it
has been estimated that an American man born in the late 1970s has a 3.3% chance of
1 See National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Causes and Conse-
quences, Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western, and Steve Redburn, eds. (Washington, DC: National Academies
Press, 2014).
2 See, for example, Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the
Criminal Justice System (2016).
3 The figures quoted in this paragraph are drawn mainly from Travis, Western, and Redburn, The Growth of
Incarceration in the United States: Causes and Consequences, Chapter 2, but see also Lauren E. Glaze and
Danielle Kaeble, ‘‘Correctional Populations in the United States, 2013,’’ U.S. Department of Justice,
December 2014, available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf; Bruce Western and Christo-
pher Wildeman, ‘‘The Black Family and Mass Incarceration,’’ Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Sciences 621 (2009): 221–242.
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being incarcerated at some point during his life; for an African-American man, the chance
is around 21%; for an African-American man without a high school diploma, that chance is
around 65%.4
Now, the fact that the probability of being punished is so much higher for some groups
than for others is a very serious injustice in itself.5 But, in this paper, I am concerned with
the injustice of mass punishment as such. The injustice of incarcerating 33% of a particular
population is not merely that that population is punished at a much higher rate than other
populations; it is also that such a rate of incarceration would be unjust for any population.
It would be no answer to this injustice to ensure that 33% of the rest of the population was
also incarcerated. And even if an overall incarceration rate of 1%, together with a rate of
other forms of criminal supervision of around 2%, was evenly and fairly distributed across
the population, it would be troublingly high. It suggests that one in every hundred citizens
is so dangerous or anti-social that he or she must be forcibly separated from the rest of his
or her fellow citizens, with all of the implications that has for participation in employment,
political activity, and family life; and that two more are so dangerous or anti-social that
they must be supervised. And a similar point can be made about other forms of punish-
ment, such as probation and fines. Modest fines are a legitimate way of encouraging
compliance with prohibitions and raising revenue. But when a government relies so heavily
on fines that its police force and judiciary are tasked with raising revenue by punishing
people, the citizens will inevitably see their institutions of criminal justice as arbitrary
revenue collectors rather than as enforcers of the law; and this will be so even if every fine
imposed actually corresponds to a violation of the law.6
2.2 Mass Punishment’s Challenge to Retributivism
For the purposes of this paper, I’ll take retributivism to be a two-part claim: punishment is
inflicted on an offender because he or she deserves punishment for having committed an
offence and not because punishing would promote some other independently defined
good.7 Retributivism, whatever else it might do, provides a constraint on when punishment
can justly be inflicted, as it prohibits punishing someone for something he or she didn’t do
or for a reason other than his or her commission of the offence. But this feature of
4 It might be thought that these discrepancies can be explained because some populations (e.g., men)
commit more offences than others (e.g., women). That is at best only part of the explanation for racial
disparities in punishment. The empirical evidence summarized by Travis, Western, and Redburn, The
Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Causes and Consequences, pp. 94–103, suggests that racial
disparities in offending can explain some, but not all, of the racial disparities in arrest rates for violent
offences, but cannot account for disparities in arrest rates for drug offences; moreover, their evidence
suggests that, once arrested, African-American defendants are treated more harshly than white defendants
throughout the criminal process.
5 On that injustice, see among others Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow (New York: The Free Press,
2010).
6 Compare Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf, documenting (among other things) one municipality’s heavy reli-
ance on fines. This is not even to mention the rule-of-law problems created by giving the police and the
courts a specific fiscal task that properly belongs to other parts of government, or the question of whether the
fiscal burden of the state would be borne more fairly by a system of just taxation.
7 Paraphrasing Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, Mary
Gregor ed. & trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 353–603, p. 6:331 (all citations to
Kant’s work will be by volume and page number of the Royal Prussian Academy edition, as they appear in
the margins of the Cambridge edition).
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retributivism is not much of a constraint on punishment in the aggregate: since retribu-
tivists hold that punishment is justified by the individual’s commission of the crime rather
than by the social costs and benefits of punishing, it seems that retributivists should be
indifferent to the amount of justified punishment that is inflicted.8 Vincent Chiao, for
example, argues that a strictly deontological retributivism—a retributivism that ‘‘(a) pur-
ports to provide an explanation of when it is permissible to punish those who commit
crimes, and… (b) does so in terms that exclude the consideration of the expected costs and
benefits of punishment’’9—can say nothing about mass punishment. So, if you are troubled
by the phenomenon of mass punishment—and who would not be?—you shouldn’t be a
strictly deontological retributivist.
One might try to avoid this claim by adopting a hybrid account of punishment,
according to which whatever good is generated by retribution could be traded off against
other goods; retribution would then be a necessary but not sufficient condition for pun-
ishment. Such an account would not be strictly deontological in Chiao’s sense and so not
subject to his critique.10 Indeed, one upshot of his argument might be that anyone con-
cerned about mass punishment, retributivists included, should welcome such hybrids. I will
offer a different reaction to the argument that strictly deontological theories of punishment
cannot object to mass punishment. When the claim that punishment must be retributive is
placed in the context of a political account of the role of punishment, it turns out that mass
punishment is troubling for the same reason that failing to punish crime at all would be
troubling: neither is consistent with the task of the state in a free society.
3 The Wrong of Mass Punishment
3.1 A Juridical-Retributivist Account of Punishment
Juridical retributivism is a family of views about punishment with one common element:
punishment is justified as a legal response to a juridical wrong, not as a response to a moral
wrong.11 It is therefore connected to one’s views about what constitutes a juridical wrong
and so to an account of the nature and purpose of the legal order in general. Suppose that
the purpose of the legal order is not to promote any particular good but to solve the
problem of how a plurality of free, purposive, and equal persons can interact with each
other in a way that preserves their freedom, purposiveness, and equality.12 Since any one
8 Vincent Chiao, ‘‘Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment,’’ Criminal Law and Philosophy
(forthcoming 2016); Robert Weisberg, ‘‘Reality-challenged Theories of Punishment,’’ Marquette Law
Review 95(4) (2012): 1203–1252; Edward Rubin, ‘‘Just Say No to Retributivism,’’ Buffalo Criminal Law
Review 7 (2003): 17–83. For a suggestion that a dose of retributivism might be part of the cure for the
injustice of mass punishment, see Allen W. Wood, ‘‘Punishment, retribution, and the coercive enforcement
of right,’’ in Lara Denis, ed., Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010): 111–129.
9 Chiao, ‘‘Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment,’’ p. 3.
10 Chiao, ‘‘Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment,’’ p. 17.
11 For what might be read, though probably not intended, as a manifesto of juridical retributivism, see
Vincent Chiao, ‘‘What Is the Criminal Law For?,’’ Law and Philosophy 35(2) (2016): 137–163. For another
version of juridical retributivism, see Alan Brudner, Punishment and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009).
12 This account is based on Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, particularly as interpreted by Arthur Ripstein,
Force and Freedom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009). For another interpretation, which
does not always agree with Ripstein’s, see B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka, Kant’s Doctrine of Right:
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person’s pursuit of his or her purposes is likely to conflict with someone else’s, and since
no free person has a right to subordinate another free person to his or her purposes, a
multitude of persons requires a structure of entitlements within which each can pursue his
or her purposes rightfully, that is, without improperly interfering with others’ pursuits of
their purposes. If and when such a structure is place, each person can be understood as
acting freely in the sense that his or her choices are independent of others’ choices. This
kind of independence does not mean that each is unaffected by the choices of others; but,
by establishing a structure in which the choice of each can be made consistent with the
choice of all, it ensures that each is entitled to use the means available to him or her to the
extent consistent with the like entitlement of others. As long as each acts within these
limits, the choices of each can be understood as subject only to the entitlements of others,
not to their choices. The permissions and limits in respect of everyone’s use of his or her
means must therefore be reciprocal; if not, some would be subject to the choice of another.
But since any individual’s enforcement of these limits can only appear arbitrary to other
individuals, these reciprocal permissions and limits have to be defined and enforced by an
agent whose conduct can be understood as having been authorized by all: that is, by the
state. The legal order must therefore consist not only of a set of rules that constitutes the
reciprocal permissions and limits but also public authorities to enact them, to enforce them,
and to decide disputes arising under them. On this view, the task of the legal order is to
guarantee ‘‘the consistent exercise of the right to freedom by a plurality of persons.’’13 It is
to take people out of the state of nature, where they are vulnerable to each other’s nec-
essarily arbitrary choices, and into a rightful condition, where each can use his or her
means consistently with everyone else’s use of their means.
If the task of the legal order is to constitute a rightful condition for free and purposive
agents, then the point of having rules that function as legal prohibitions on certain kinds of
conduct is clear enough, but the point of making the violation of these rules criminally
punishable, rather than providing compensatory remedies or encouraging compliance in
other ways, is not immediately obvious. If each of us has an entitlement to use our means
as we see fit, subject to the limits required by the like entitlement of others, then it follows
that each of us will be subject to various prohibitions on interfering with the entitlements of
others. But why enforcement might take the form of punishment, rather than, e.g., reme-
diation, is harder to understand. Moreover, in contemporary legal orders, the vast majority
of penal law has little or nothing to do with wrongful use of or damage to another private
person’s means. And one might wonder why punishment, as opposed to other means of
encouraging compliance with regulatory law, would be appropriate. These questions are
particularly difficult in light of some characteristics typical of strictly deontological
retributivism: the claims that liability to punishment depends only on the commission of
the crime and that the quantum of punishment is determined by the nature of the crime.14
This kind of retributivism seems to permit, perhaps even require, punishment where it will
Footnote 12 continued
A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Two accounts of the state that are very
much in the same tradition but that de-emphasize their Kantian origins are Julius Ebbinghaus, ‘‘The Law of
Humanity and the Limits of State Power,’’ Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1953): 14–22, and Jacob Weinrib,
‘‘Authority, justice and public law: A unified theory,’’ University of Toronto Law Journal 64(5) (2014):
703–735.
13 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 9; see also Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 6:232–6:233; Weinrib,
‘‘Authority, justice and public law: A unified theory,’’ pp. 707–715.
14 See, for example, Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 6:331.
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neither remedy the private or public wrongs in question nor do anything concrete to
promote the protection of rights.
Arthur Ripstein, building on the work of other modern juridical retributivists,15 deals
with these puzzles as follows. He argues that criminal punishment in the rightful condition
has both a deterrent and a retributive aspect. In its deterrent aspect, it is a threat to those
who would consider pursuing their purposes by committing a juridical wrong; in its
retributive aspect, it is a response to the commission of a juridical wrong. Deterrence is the
prospect of enforcement in case a penal prohibition is violated; retribution is enforcement
made actual in particular cases of wrongdoing. A threatened punishment that was incapable
of deterring or that was never imposed following the commission of a crime would not be a
way of enforcing the law at all. The threat of punishment is the law’s announcement of its
superiority over the individual’s view about the rights and wrongs of his or her conduct,
while the imposition of punishment is the law’s response to the criminal’s attempt to
exempt himself or herself from the demands of public law. Accordingly, ‘‘[criminal]
punishment is nothing more than the supremacy of the law.’’16 Indeed, Ripstein argues that
the legal order must punish criminals because its failure to do so allows the criminal to
effectively assert the superiority of his or her private ends over the public task of creating
and maintaining a rightful condition.17 He justifies retributive punishment as one of the
necessary functions of the state in a rightful condition.
3.2 The Wrong of Mass Punishment
For the purposes of this paper, I accept the juridical retributive idea at the core of Rip-
stein’s account: criminal punishment is imposed only as the law’s response to the crime
committed by the offender. But this juridical retributivism seems to have a powerful and
troubling implication: it suggests, not only that punishment is a permissible response to
whatever happens to be defined as a crime, but that punishment is a mandatory response to
juridical wrongs of all kinds. I show why this implication seems to follow, but that
demonstration will merely be a foil for showing that an unremitting approach to punish-
ment is itself inconsistent with a rightful condition.
To show how mandatory punishment of all juridical wrongs seems to follow from
juridical retributivism, consider the following hypothetical situation. Suppose that an
otherwise legitimate state interprets the task of creating and maintaining a rightful con-
dition as requiring it to detect, prosecute, and punish all violations of right. If the reason for
punishing is to restore the superiority of the law over the individual who seeks to exempt
himself or herself from its demands, then there would seem to be a strong case for
criminalizing all intentional violations of right, not just those wrongs like theft and assault
that are typically considered to be at the core of criminal law, but also intentional breaches
of contract, intentional interferences with status relationships, and intentional violations of
15 Notably B. Sharon Byrd, ‘‘Kant’s Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat, Retribution in Its
Execution,’’ Law and Philosophy 8(2) (1989): 151–200, and Thomas Hill, Respect, Pluralism, and Justice
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 173–199. For some doubts about whether this line of argument
provides the best interpretation of Kant’s theory of punishment, see Wood, ‘‘Punishment, retribution, and the
coercive enforcement of right.’’.
16 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 302; compare Malcolm Thorburn, ‘‘Criminal Law as Public Law,’’ in
R.A. Duff and Stuart Green, eds., Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2011), 21–43, p. 41.
17 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, pp. 320–321.
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any otherwise justifiable regulatory prohibition.18 The claim of the juridical retributivist is
that ‘‘crime is wrongful because of its incompatibility with the form of public lawgiv-
ing.’’19 But that form is nothing more than the positive law itself, those legal rules and
procedures that are the institutionalized versions of the principles of private law, the
‘‘omnilateral public law [that] replaces unilateral private judgment.’’20 The wrong of the
criminal ‘‘is to exempt himself from the public legal regulation of conduct and resolution
of disputes’’ by deciding for himself what is his, rather than determining what is his by
looking to the law and the system for resolving particular disputes under the law.21 Thus, in
principle, any intentional violation of right, private or public, is a potential crime because
all intentional violations of right have exactly that character: the person who commits them
decides for himself or herself what he or she is entitled to rather than remitting that
question to the law. So, to maintain the superiority of the law, the state might decide to
punish all intentional violations of right.
One might argue that this hypothetical overstates the proper scope of permissible
criminalization and prosecution in the rightful condition.22 This objection has four bran-
ches. First, one might think that, apart from its implications for the level of punishment, the
project of criminalizing all intentional violations of private right is itself inconsistent with
the idea of a system of freedom. Perhaps there is some principled distinction between
private wrongs that are appropriately remedied only in private law and those that are also
of public concern23; if so, the distinction could be deployed as a restraint on criminal-
ization and therefore on mass punishment. But the legal retributivist position that I have
presented does not provide such a distinction because it locates the wrong of any inten-
tional violation of right in its deliberate defiance of the legal order.
The second branch of the objection is that regulatory violations should not be treated the
same way as true crimes.24 If that is right, then one would need an account of how
regulatory prohibitions could be enforced without penal sanctions. Perhaps such an account
is possible, but I am not aware of one, and it does not figure in the practice of modern
states. Moreover, the idea that the purpose of punishment is just to ensure the application of
18 From a Kantian point of view, there is a difference between violations of private right, which he thought
could be shown a priori to be wrongful, and violations of public laws, which do not involve any violation of
anyone’s private right, the wrongfulness of which is therefore contingent on the public reasons for creating
the prohibition in question. For my purposes in this paper, all regulatory offences belong in the latter
category. Whether this distinction tracks the commonly invoked distinction between ‘‘true crimes’’ and
public welfare offences is not critical here.
19 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 314.
20 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 312.
21 Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 313.
22 I thank Patrick Macklem and David Dyzenhaus for pressing me on this point. But see Douglas Husak,
Overcriminalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), for a discussion of the extent to which the
penal law of the U.S. is already like this.
23 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 6:331, 6:224; Ripstein, Force and Freedom, p. 313. See also the
account of public wrongs developed by Duff and Marshall; though they use a less austere conception of the
state than the one I work with here: R.A. Duff and Sandra Marshall, ‘‘Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs,’’
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 11(1) (1998): 7–22; R.A. Duff and Sandra Marshall, ‘‘Public
and Private Wrongs,’’ in James Chalmers et al., eds., Essays in Criminal Law in Honour of Sir Gerald
Gordon (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010): 70–85.
24 For some thoughts about this possibility, see Brudner, Punishment and Freedom, Chapter 5. An argument
for the legitimacy of the regulatory state in Kantian terms is made in Hamish Stewart, ‘‘Kantian Police: The
Limits of Consent in Regulatory Law,’’ New Criminal Law Review 17(1) (2014): 1–22, but the argument
deals only briefly with the legitimacy of punishment as a means of enforcing the regulatory state’s rules.
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the law fits regulatory offences better than any other part of the penal law. Regulatory
offences characteristically do not require proof of any identifiable wrong apart from the
violation of the rule itself. So, from the point of view of juridical retributivism, the point of
the punishment is precisely the law’s reasserting itself. Punishing the jaywalker who
unlawfully crosses the street when he or she correctly judges that it is perfectly safe to do
so can have no purpose other than the law’s demonstrating its own superiority over the
individual who seeks to substitute his or her own judgment for its.
Third, perhaps the hypothetical overstates the scope of criminalization in general.
Surely a system of equal freedom would not criminalize the exercises of basic political and
personal freedoms, such as deciding what political views to express, what books to read,
what clothes to wear. That is true, but the hypothetical does not depend on the criminal-
ization of such conduct because such conduct is not juridically wrongful. What drives the
hypothetical is not the thought that the legislature could criminalize conduct that is not
juridically wrongful; it is rather to investigate what would happen if the state chose to
criminalize all intentionally committed juridical wrongs, that is, all intentional violations
of private right and of otherwise justifiable regulatory law.
Fourth and finally, it might be said that the hypothetical overlooks the possibility of
prosecutorial discretion. And so it does. But that is because prosecutorial discretion is
inconsistent with the claim that punishment of all juridical wrongs is mandatory. Any
account of prosecutorial discretion appropriate to this account of the rightful condition will
face the same problem as an account of criminalization: what kind of reasons are
acceptable for failing to prosecute and punish juridical wrongs? If the state understands the
creation or maintenance of a rightful condition to require it to punish all intentionally
juridical committed wrongs, then it must also prosecute all apparent wrongs; otherwise,
some of those wrongs would escape punishment.
So, suppose the state decides to pursue a policy of relentlessly criminalizing and
punishing all intentional juridical wrongs. There are two steps the state would have to take
to implement this policy. First, the state would review the scope of the existing criminal
law and ensure that every intentional violation of right was not only remediable in
whatever manner was appropriate to the private or public wrong at issue but also criminally
punishable.25 Second, the state would resolutely prosecute every apparent offender for
every apparent offence. Assume that the procedural rules of the legal order have been so
perfected that most factually guilty offenders are convicted while wrongful convictions are
vanishingly unlikely. Assume further that prosecutorial decisions are made fairly, in the
sense that the likelihood of prosecution and punishment is distributed equally across the
population of actual offenders. Notwithstanding these restraints, one would anticipate that,
in such a legal order, there would be a very large number of criminal convictions and a
great deal of criminal punishment. Depending on the extent of offending, it could well be a
world of mass punishment; applied to the world we live in, it surely would be.
Life in such a legal order would not be a life of freedom. This hypothetical state would
be one in which every person would pursue his or her purposes under the ever-present and
very real threat of prosecution and punishment. Given the density of penal law in our
hypothetical legal order, it is likely that a very high proportion of the population would
commit a penal offence every day, thus justifying punishment, not to mention the likeli-
hood that they would apparently commit such an offence, thus justifying prosecution
25 In one respect, the penal law of this hypothetical state would be more restrained than that of actually
existing states. In most jurisdictions, the prosecution is not required to prove fault, or at any rate not
subjective fault, for regulatory offences and sometimes not even for true crimes.
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(though not punishment). But no-one can live the life of a free and purposive person under
the threat of a high likelihood of prosecution and punishment. This is not the life of one
who is constrained only by the rules necessary to ensure the mutual consistency of
everyone’s purposiveness; it is the life of a person constrained by the fear of perpetual
interruption of his or her purposiveness. This is not the conduct of a state devoted to
securing equal freedom for all; it is the conduct of a state that is obsessed with repeatedly
demonstrating its superiority over its own citizens. Resolute criminalization and prose-
cution of all wrongs—and its inevitable by-product, mass punishment—is itself incon-
sistent with the task of the rightful condition.
Accepting the claim that mass punishment is inconsistent with the juridical task of the
rightful condition requires us to abandon the thought that punishment of juridical wrongs is
mandatory. It does not, however, require us to reject the picture of the state based on the
idea of equal freedom for all; rather, it shows that punishment is both required and limited
by the idea of equal freedom. The threat of punishment —and in some cases, its actuality—
is justified by its role in maintaining the rightful condition; but too much punishment is
inconsistent with a rightful condition.
3.3 What Kind of a Wrong is Mass Punishment?
Mass punishment is not a wrong to any particular individual who is punished. The pun-
ishment of particular individuals is justified on retributive grounds. But mass punishment is
wrong because it is inconsistent with the idea of the rightful condition. The idea that
conduct can be wrongful without wronging anyone in particular is familiar enough, but
may seem odd in the context of an account of the state based solely on ideas of right: if an
action has violated no-one’s right, not even the state’s, it seems that the actor has com-
mitted no juridical wrong, that is, no wrong relating to rights. But this kind of wrong
played an important role in Kant’s political philosophy, from which the account of the state
given above derives. Kant’s terminology for this kind of wrong varied: he called it a
‘‘formal wrong’’ (as opposed to the ‘‘material wrong’’ to the particular victim of the crime),
a ‘‘wrong in the highest degree,’’ and a ‘‘wrong to humanity in general.’’ Three of his
examples will illustrate the idea. Kant famously claims that one who lies to a murderer
about the whereabouts of the intended victim does no wrong to the murderer but commits
‘‘a wrong inflicted upon humanity generally.’’26 In discussing the transition from the state
of nature to the civil condition, he argues that ‘‘human beings do one another no wrong at
all when they feud among themselves’’; nevertheless, if they prefer to remain in the state of
nature, ‘‘they do wrong in the highest degree’’27 by choosing to remain in a condition
where each can secure what is his or hers only by violence rather than by right.28 And he
argues that a ruler who exercises clemency in favour of a criminal who has committed a
crime against her wrongs no-one—the only person who might be wronged here is the
sovereign, who cannot wrong herself—but ‘‘is thereby doing injustice in the highest
degree.’’29
26 Kant, ‘‘On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy,’’ in Practical Philosophy: 605–615, p. 8:426. For
two recent and illuminating discussions of that essay, see Jacob Weinrib, ‘‘The Juridical Significance of
Kant’s ‘Supposed Right to Lie’’’ Kantian Review 13(1) (2008): 141–170; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech
Matters (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), Chapter 1.
27 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 6:307.
28 Ibid., pp. 6:307–308.
29 Ibid., p. 6:337.
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These three examples have two features in common. First, in each case, the person who
acts does no wrong to any particular person but does a wrong to the rightful condition, in
the following sense. The person acts on a maxim which, if universalized, would make a
rightful condition impossible: founding rightful relations on falsehoods, refusing to punish
offenders, or refusing to enter into a rightful condition in the first place. One is tempted to
observe that a well-functioning rightful condition can tolerate a limited amount of this
behaviour, just as it can tolerate a certain level of crime: the presence of the occasional
Freeman on the Land who actively rejects the state’s authority,30 the occasional falsehood,
or the occasional act of clemency does not cause the state to collapse. But that is not Kant’s
point: he identifies the wrong as the inconsistency of the maxim of the action with the
possibility of a rightful condition. Second, in each case, the action, though a juridical
wrong (a wrong concerning the rights of others) is not itself punishable or amenable to
juridical remedy. In the case of persons in the state of nature who refuse to enter into a
rightful condition with each other, there is by definition no-one who has the authority to
force them into a rightful condition, much less to punish them: the defining feature of the
state of nature is precisely the absence of this authority. The ruler who exercises clemency
cannot be punished nor can his act of clemency be undone by other institutional actors; one
of the features of executive authority, for Kant, is the absence of any other person or
institution with the authority to undo its decisions of this kind.31 The case of the lie is more
complex, but the general picture is the same. Kant does indeed argue that a person who lies
to the murderer at the door is juridically responsible for the consequences of the lie,32 but
he does not suggest that the liar is punishable for the lie itself, and he recognizes other
cases where a liar is not juridically responsible for the consequences of a lie.33
Acting on a policy of prosecuting and punishing every juridical wrongdoer has the same
two characteristics. First, punishing all wrongdoers is not a wrong to anyone in particular.
No-one can complain that he or she, in particular, has been wrongly punished; after all, the
offender is proved to have committed the offence in question. Second, punishing all
wrongdoers is not action that is readily amenable to legal control. It is properly the task of
the legislature to define offences, of the police to investigate crime, of prosecutors to
prosecute apparent offenders, of courts to sentence offenders, and of the executive to carry
out the sentences imposed. None of these state officials does wrong in any particular case
in carrying out these functions; moreover, none of them has the authority to direct any of
the others in carrying out their functions. It is true that, in common law systems at least,
judges can stop individual prosecutions that have become unfair; but it would be
extraordinary for a judge to acquit a guilty thief because enough thieves had already been
convicted that day or to issue an injunction limiting the number of prosecutions that could
be brought because there had been enough prosecutions already.34 The wrong of mass
punishment, like other wrongs to the rightful condition that have no particular victim, is
difficult to regulate by law but can be controlled through judicious decision-making about
what conduct to criminalize and what offences to prosecute.
30 See Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571.
31 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 6:316–317.
32 Kant, ‘‘On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy,’’ p. 8:427.
33 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 6:238.
34 Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 563 U.S. __ (2011), a decision that may help to remedy mass incar-
ceration, was not based on a claim, much less a holding, that mass punishment was wrong as such; rather, it
was concerned with the conditions under which prisoners were held.
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3.4 Objections and Remedies
I now turn to some objections that might be made to the claim that mass punishment is
unjust. Although those objections must be rejected, they do point to the institutional
considerations that can serve to remedy, or better still to avoid, the wrong of mass
punishment.
First, perhaps I have too readily assumed that a citizen’s behaviour will be unaffected by
vigorous enforcement of the penal law. Perhaps it is true that, under current conditions,
pedestrians in Paris, Beijing, and New York treat traffic signals as giving mere recom-
mendations rather than as creating legal obligations; but if traffic violations were regularly
and rigorously punished, as they are said to be in Singapore, perhaps the law governing
pedestrian traffic would be more frequently obeyed. We could have the cake of the rightful
condition (compliance with the law) and eat it too (no mass punishment). There is
something to this objection, as it is hard to believe that behaviour is entirely unaffected by
the extent to which the law is enforced (even if, as the social science evidence indicates, it
is not much affected by the severity of punishment). But it is an essentially empirical
objection. It does not exclude the possibility that vigorous enforcement may affect the
incidence of the activity very little or not at all, as appears to have been the case in the so-
called ‘‘war on drugs.’’ Thus, it does not exclude the possibility of mass punishment. It
does suggest, though, that the decision to punish wrongs, as opposed to using other policy
instruments for discouraging and deterring them, should be sensitive to whatever empirical
evidence there might be concerning the effectiveness of those instruments. That may sound
like an odd conclusion for a retributivist to reach, and for a moral retributivist it would be.
But, for a juridical retributivist who is concerned about the effectiveness of right, it is not.
As the hypothetical suggests, the idea of punishing to uphold right does not itself limit the
conduct that can be justly prosecuted and punished; so, in seeking such limits, the juridical
retributivist should be concerned about the effectiveness of criminalization as a way of
maintaining a rightful condition.
Second, it might be said that if there is a lot of crime, then of course there will be a lot of
prosecution and punishment. To take an extreme example, suppose ‘‘half the population
steals a kidney from the other half of the population, and that all of the kidney thieves are
promptly captured, prosecuted and imprisoned for a few months.’’35 To take a more
realistic example, if there is a very high incidence of a serious crime like sexual assault that
itself seriously interferes with the freedom of all or of a significant portion of the popu-
lation, one would hope that the government would vigorously prosecute and punish it. The
extreme example does not affect the claims I make here. If it really was the case that half
the population was disposed to steal kidneys from the other half, then it is unlikely whether
a rightful condition could be maintained at all, in which case no question of state pun-
ishment could arise. In the realistic example, the objection has some force: if there is more
crime, it is reasonable to expect more prosecution and punishment. But the example speaks
to the prosecution of a particular crime, and a very serious one; it does not speak to the
prosecution of all imaginable wrongs or even of all wrongs that are currently criminalized.
And there is no doubt that legislative caution in deciding what to criminalize is one of the
possible remedies for mass punishment.36 My claim is not that there is some ideal level of
35 Chiao, ‘‘Mass Incarceration and the Theory of Punishment,’’ p. 15; he attributes this example to Kit
Wellman.
36 Compare Byrd and Hruschka, Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary, Chapter 13, suggesting that for
Kant the criminalization of wrongs was optional; though they do not address the question of what conduct
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punishment that can be determined independently of facts such as the incidence of crime.
Nor do I claim that it would be wrong for the state to choose to vigorously prosecute and
punish particular crimes. The purpose of the hypothetical is not to show that vigorous
prosecution of particular crimes of public concern is wrongful; it is rather to show that a
policy of unremittingly prosecuting and punishing all wrongs is inconsistent with the idea
of the rightful condition that gives rise to the right to punish in the first place.
Finally, it may be objected that my account is consequentialist: mass punishment is to
be deplored because of the bad consequence it brings about: a threat to the rightful
condition. This is an objection not to consequentialism as such but to my assertion that I
have provided an account of the wrong of mass punishment that a deontological retribu-
tivist could accept. Perhaps my account is just another way of abandoning retributivism for
a hybrid account of punishment, and so is a suitable response to neither Chiao’s critique
nor Ripstein’s defence of retributivism.
There is a sense in which this objection is correct: the wrong of mass punishment is
connected to the state of the world that comes about when the legal order engages in mass
punishment. The claim is that a state that punishes excessively, if it is a rightful condition
at all, is a less successful exemplar of a rightful condition than a state that punishes
moderately, just as a legitimate state that nevertheless enforces some unjust laws is a less
successful exemplar of a rightful condition than a state that has no unjust laws at all. A
claim of this kind is not consequentialist in the usual sense: it does not judge the value of a
decision to criminalize or to prosecute only by its contribution to the achievement of some
good. My claim is not that these decisions should depend on an all-things-considered
assessment of their likely consequences, but that a policy of resolute prosecution of all
possible crimes is wrongful because it is inconsistent with the project of constructing and
maintaining a legal order so that it is a rightful condition. And that exercise itself is not a
consequentialist one in the usual sense. The good of the legal order is not something that
can be maximized or defined independently of the process that constitutes it. And so the
wrong of mass punishment is not defined by any particular effect that it is likely to have on
the legal order (though that effect is likely to be very bad).37 Indeed, if mass punishment is
the kind of wrong I have described, then both prosecutorial discretion about which (ap-
parent) offenders to prosecute and legislative discretion about which juridical wrongs to
criminalize are not just permissible but required. Some rightful conditions are better than
others, and one that acts on a policy of unremitting prosecution and punishment is in that
respect worse than one that does not. And that is because the practice of mass punishment
is itself inconsistent with the idea of a rightful condition. The idea that the state should
resolutely punish everyone who has apparently attempted to exempt himself or herself
from the demands of the legal order puts the state in the position of using punitive force so
regularly against its citizens—routinely depriving them of liberty and property—that it can
only appear to those citizens as their enemy rather than as the agent who acts on behalf of
all of them to define and preserve their freedom.
Footnote 36 continued
should be criminally punishable. Duff and Marshall, ‘‘Public and Private Wrongs,’’ pp. 77–78, propose five
methods of ‘‘de- or non-criminalisation,’’ which could be very helpful to the legislature in this respect.
37 So I have no quarrel with those who have recounted the deleterious effects of mass punishment. Par-
ticularly compelling, from the point of view I adopt here, is the criminogenic effect of mass incarceration:
see, for example, the summary of research in Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Culen, and Cheryl Lero Johnson,
‘‘Imprisonment and Reoffending,’’ Crime and Justice 38 (2009): 115–200.
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4 Conclusion
The phenomenon of mass punishment, whereby a state imprisons or otherwise penally
sanctions a significant percentage of its population, is disturbing. It is generally, and
probably correctly, criticized on the ground of its inutility. Retributivism, the view that the
justification for punishment is individual wrongdoing, does not seem to have the resources
to criticize mass punishment: precisely because it focuses on the justification for punishing
the individual rather than on the aggregate of punishment, it seems incapable of expressing
any concern about how many people are punished. In this paper, I have argued that, despite
this appearance, mass punishment is indeed wrongful from the point of view of a political
theory that takes the task of the state to be the creation and maintenance of a rightful
condition, a legal order in which free individuals can interact with each other on the basis
of right. In such a legal order, punishment must be retributive in the sense that it can only
be imposed as a response to individual juridical wrongdoing; but, since the purpose of the
legal order is not to give everyone what they deserve from some moral point of view but to
be a rightful condition, mass punishment is wrongful because it is inconsistent with that
purpose. A state that interpreted its mandate as requiring it to criminalize and punish all
possible wrongdoing would not be a rightful condition; it would be a condition in which
no-one could pursue his or her own purposes without the constant fear of being coercively
interrupted by prosecution. No one institution of the rightful condition can, by itself,
prevent mass prosecution and therefore mass punishment; but the legislature can help by
exercising restraint in the creation of criminal offences, and the executive can help by
limiting prosecution to conduct that concretely threatens the legal order.
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